Rationality, Educated Opinion and Peace Essay

AbstractThis musical composition addresses the rele traince of inter cont dis stray supposition to the building of counterinsurgency by dint of with(predicate) examining the roots of common chord important bring outrs of the period Ed fightd H each(prenominal)ett Carr, Norman Angell and Alfred Zimmern. The role of macrocosm persuasion was under much interrogative sentence in the politics of the period they wrote in, and crucial to this issue argon the gestures as to whether the in the public eye(predicate) heed is able number and capable of reason. These writers atomic number 18 concerned with the influence of public opinion and believe that through educating the public mind, the surmisal of calm can be increased. Drawing from their ideas, this paper thus postulates that stop is a product of rationality and there is possibility of progress through education.The birth of internationalist transaction as a go a shootst discipline was founded against the context of the inter contend years, which brought most important consequences for the subsequent development of the inter struggle years. The tensions precedent to and the subsequent devastation of the corking fightfare forced smarts of the early twentieth century to seek ex deviceations for the causes of war and to postulate measures by which another(prenominal) catastrophe could be pr blushted. The general point of the people exerted an influence on the direction of international studies.As David Long points out, the academic study of international affairs during this period of time possessed a normative though not of necessity utopian interest in the scheme of war1. Such a trend is manifested in the trust deed of the Wilson Chair of outside(a) Politics ( genius of the first hardly a(prenominal) schools of the discipline), which states that international politics is the semi semipolitical science in its application to international relations with special reference to the van quish heart and soul of promoting peace between nations.2Woodrow Wilson, being a leading statesman at the time, presents virtuoso of the possible avenues for peace. He consciously and deliberately tied issues of orthogonal form _or_ system of government to domestic politics, giving ski lift to what allow for come to be known as the democratic peace thesis. Wilson advocates the feel that normal participation, public life and opportunity for all lead be the guarantee of peace. Wilson believed that diplomacy and foreign policy must(prenominal) be taken with regard to public opinion and the public being rational would prefer peace to war.3 The crucial premise here is that public opinion matters in a democratic political trunk. The given further made is that the political leaders are sensitive to public opinion and entrust be susceptible to their demands.The issue of public opinion gives rise to another set of issues, and ane of the foremost in this period, is the skepticism that the basic assumption of a rational public rejecting war is true. Is the public rational? Is war a rational weft? The political definition of rationality is the ability of the public to discern the options blustering to them, and to adopt the best option to achieve their prioritized goals.The outstanding state of war cast doubts as to whether public is needfully aware of what their options and goals are, much less their ability to choose the best option to fit their preferred part. As historian A. J. P. Taylor argues that the quick-witted backlash against the de valet de chambreizing war made the interwar years an age of intellectual and artistic action at law, where intellectuals from respective(a) fields of study question the spot of man to reason.4 The devastation of war brings queries, particularly from the idealists, as to whether war can be a rational choice. Even if the assumption holds true, there is still the question as to whether public opinion has any weigh t on policy editionulation. inclined this particular context, this paper questions the foundations of Wilsonian politics. This paper allow for thus postulate on the influence of public opinion and the impress of rationality on the maintenance of peace by drawing from the ideas of three important writers of this period Edward Hallett Carr, Norman Angell and Alfred Zimmern. This paper will first introduce the positions of all three writers. It will accordingly examine the sound assumption cared by all three writers with respect to public opinion, before expounding on their principles on the rationality of the public and why the issue matters. The paper will then(prenominal) look into the possibilities of peace, and how the three co-occur on the issue of education. Due to source constraints, this paper will draw on indirect references to the works of the three writers, where the primary sources are not available.Carr, Angell and ZimmernPeter Wilson in Thinkers of the twenty old age Crisis introduces Carrs tidings as a work which not yet set the tone for subsequent intervention of inter-war thought, but likewise substantially shaped postwar attitudes towards it.5 The premise for The Twenty Years Crisis is the reappraisal of inter-war idealism, which Carr enclosures utopian6. Carr dismisses the utopians as being unable to understand political reality and sets up a dichotomy that supposes utopia reality= free will determinism= theory practice= morality ability =universal sexual intercourse= intellectual bureaucrat= Left Right 7 The dichotomy presented by Carr undermines interwar idealism, and leads, in part, to the rejection of the mulish pry of these theories. This dichotomy shapes subsequent debate and is consequentially identified as the polarity of realism and idealism, which will eclipse international studies for the next few decades.In order to posit queries of the dichotomy, it is first necessary to expound on the assumptions that are conventionally made of either school. Brian C. Schmidt summarises the assumptions of idealism as follows a pervasive faith in reason and rationalism, a belief in the infallibility of public opinion, the view that war was irrational number, that the best way to end conflict was through education, international law, and world g everywherenment, and, finally, a belief that the essential harmony of interests existed, which translated into the international doctrine of war-does-not-pay8.Superficially, both Norman Angell and Alfred Zimmern adopt much(prenominal) assumptions in their writings. Significantly, both Angell and Zimmern share the same reverence to one key tenet the possibility of progress through educating public opinion and conditioning human deportment. Their devotion to the tenet became stronger posterior into their careers, especially after the Second World War. The realist school of thought as correspond by Carr, refutes the idealist assumptions. In particular, the realists argue that the concept of power is central to international affairs.Carr adopts Thomas Hobbes demarcation on human constitution and advances the argument that the state as a rational actor will choose to maximize its capacity for power in order to secure its survival. He argues that public opinion, even when informed, is not necessarily pacifist and that thought can be mould by political purposes. by federal agency of defining his position by rejecting and critiquing the idealists assumptions, Carrs realist position is thus seen as the diametric opposite of the idealists.It is then necessary to redress both the ideas of Carr and the much-maligned interwar idealists, among whom are Zimmern and Angell. The choice of juxtaposing Angell and Zimmern with Carr in this paper is conscious. Both Zimmern and Angell are among the few utopians whom Carr explicitly criticizes in The Twenty Years Crisis. Andreas Osiander points out that Zimmern is still widely regarded as what Oslon and Groom see called the carry out idealist9, and is thus identifiable with the idealist school of thought. Yet Zimmern, as Paul lavish and Peter Wilson suggest, is considerably less adverse to Carrs ideas than his idealist colleagues.10 Angell, on the other hand, is one of the fiercest adversaries to The Twenty Years Crisis, but J. D. Miller raises the argument that Angell should be regarded less as an idealist than a off the beaten track(predicate) sighted realist because of his acute awareness of the issues of political reality11. The inter athletics of their ideas then calls to question the validity of a clear dichotomy.In essence then, this paper seek to question if the positions of these writers on the assumptions raised by Schmidt are as concrete as they appear to be. In other words, this paper examines the complexities of Carr, Angell and Zimmerns ideas on the applicability of public opinion, rationality and possibilities of peace. On closer examination, this paper argue s that despite the differences, the three share a fundamental similarity the belief in progress. The dichotomy between the realists and idealists is permeable, and in their postulation of the long term, the arguments of Carr, Angell and Zimmern coincide.Public OpinionFirst and foremost, the inherent assumption that Carr, Angell and Zimmern adopt is that public opinion matters, even though their understanding of public opinion differs. Zimmern argues that public opinion is the lifeblood of a civilized community but unfortunately, the majority of the peoples is pass offd by caprice of ignorance, passion or greed, and the other devils if unreason.12 The title of Carrs inaugural barbarism at the University College of Wales, Public Opinion as a Safeguard of pause says much. Carr argues that public opinion can exert awe-inspiring influence over a foreign policy issue that it feels sufficiently strongly about, using the case of the public rejection of the Hoare-Laval plan to build his case.He states that, No nation, and least of all a democracy, can wage war unless it has the carry of an overwhelming majority of its people13. The implication of such(prenominal) a financial statement in light of guarding the peace is that inso furthermost as the public is not in favour of war, a state and particularly a democratic state will not and cannot adopt war as a policy instrument. Angells Nobel Lecture, Peace and the Public Mind, adopts the same position, except that he argues public opinion, being misinformed and disastrously false can lead to war. 14Interestingly both Angell and Carr argue that public opinion is easily manipulated. Carr devotes a section to Power over opinion in The Twenty Years Crisis, suggesting that the greater proportion of public becoming conscious or involved in politics relates to the importance that the regnant elite place on propaganda as an instrument of power. The influence of propaganda rests on the premise he sets earlier in the book that the crucial contribution of realism is the idea that thought is relative to purpose. 15 For instance, nationalism, as a form of ideology, could be seen as a means by which the public can be acquitd to go to war. Similarly, Angell contends that a small militant minority is capable of appealing to the majority towards a policy that may not be in the majoritys best interests.16RationalityHaving established that public opinion has a role to play, we then move on to the crucial questions is the public rational, and is war a rational choice? On both issues, there are significant differences between Carr and the idealists, arising from the difference in the way they interpret and infer from past and authorized events. Reason and rationality give rise to different matters for Carr and the idealists. An important honoring is that Carr places to a greater extent faith in reason and rationality than do the others, contrary to our earlier presupposition that it is the idealists who check a pervasive faith in reason and rationalism.A proper definition of what is meant by rational behaviour has yet to be stomachd as a premise for argument. To proceed, we adopt James Mills argument for the rational public opinion quoted in Carr as a guide to what rational behaviour entails both man possessed of reason is accustomed to weigh evidence and to be guided and determined by its preponderance. When various conclusions are, with their evidence presented with equal care and with equal skill, there is a moral certainty, though just about few maybe misguided, that greatest number will judge right, and the greatest force of evidence, whatever it is, will produce the greatest impression. 17Whereas Carr believes that the public, being self-interested, is capable of defining their goals and seeking the best possible means to achieve toward that end, he rejects Mills definition of rational behaviour. Mills definition is in turn base on the ideas espoused by Jeremy Betham who a ssumes that the ideal option is the greatest good to the greatest number. Carr argues that public opinion comes from the masses, who are for large part, neither enlightened nor educated and thus the greatest number need not necessarily judge right.He argues that Betham and Mills assumption that self-interest can be sacrificed for the sake of the greatest good to the collective is ground on some kind of intuition of what is right and cannot be demonstrated by rational argument.18 Carr suggests, instead, that rational necessarily demands a consciousness and the ability to fructify to the balance of power existing in international affairs, which serves as a constraint on the options available. The tell apart public thus does not provided take into account what is right, but also what is most practical in catering to self-interest.Carr then adopts an argument that is parallel to Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, in Leviathan, states the fundamental law of temper asit is a precept, or general rule of reason that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use all helps, and advantages of warCarr comments, to the same effect, that although war is undesirable, it is not possible to impose an absolute judgement that war is always and categorically wrong. The implication of Hobbes and Carrs argument is that the public being rational favours peace. However, when the public believes that they have more to gain from war, or more to lose from not going to war, war becomes a rational and logical solution.Historically, Carrs argument seems to find sufficient basis in the outbreak of World War I. One of the reasons lend to the war was the increase in bellicosity, arising from rationalization of cost and benefit or cooperation and non-cooperation. Prior to the massive War, the perceived cost of non-cooperation19 had decreased. The perception was influenced by beliefs that any war would be short, a c onsequence of a super exaggerated faith in the efficacy of offensive troops strategies and tactics20 and by the dodging of alliances. The perception was further coloured by nationalism. Secondly the perceived gains of non-cooperation had increased. The general belief was that expansionism and offensive foreign policy was perceived to be alike high, over receivable to the general suspicion of the intentions of the other states. Given these perceptions then prevalent, European states saw it to their advantage to go to war, and in incident to initiate the war so as to reap the greatest advantage of the ground. This international game theory exemplifies in part the rational edge that Carr espoused.The idealists depart greatly from Carr. Angell and Zimmern accept that Mills definition is greatly desired but finds it incongruent with political reality. Reus-Smit, in his essay The Strange expiry of Liberal Theory, argues that the conflict between morality and political reality is s een by Angell as a divide between reason and unreason. He argues that, If the actor prevailed, there was some hope of a reconciliation between morality, defined as the healthy-being of all and reality, which in Angells favoured area was the incompatibility of warfare and such well-being.21 However, within the historical context, Angell believes that unreason prevailed. Angell believes that the public mind is often irrational, because it is too easily persuaded it does not possess sufficient learning, nor the ability to process vast amounts of information when it is available and it lacks the skill to seek evidence for the various conclusions, as Mill points out, i.e., it cannot see the likely results of actions.22 The public mind cannot compute cost-benefit-analysis, which is central to rationalization. Angell accounts for this irrationality of the public mind, stating that it arises from the failure to apply to our international relationships intimacy which is of practically un iversal possession23 In Angells opinion then, it is not for the lack of intellectual capacity on the part of the public that lead to the irrational behaviour, but the inability to apply knowledge.Resting on his idea of the irrational public, Angell expounds on the war and why the publics choice to go to war is actually irrational. In his aptly named book, The Great magic, he puts forth a convincing argument on the futility of war on grounds of rationality and economic considerations. Angell argues that the perceived benefits of war under modern circumstances, are reduced, as victors can no longer expect to benefit as much from the spoils of war. The miscellanea is generally because goods and spoils are no longer portable (such as gold, silver, slaves, precious stones) as they had before. Goods and services are non-physical such as currency, shares, and fixed assets, and are thus not transferable wealth. As such, if states act purely in their self-interest, given the expectation n ot to gain from war, states would be unlikely to pursue war.24Angell considers this line of reasoning to be simplistic and easily applicable to the conduct of international relations. Yet as the advent of World War I proves, the public is incapable of applying such rationale to political practice. Angell argues that the pervading reasons fag end war, then, are irrational. Not only does war not serve to the benefit of the state concerned, better alternatives of action could be sought such as building economic relations, social interaction. Such connections can be used in persuading, as opposed to coercing, other states into behaving in the manner that is beneficial to the state concerned. Thus the argument adopted is that war is irrational, i.e. not the best-laid option, and man being irrational and susceptible to external influences, chooses to use war as a policy instrument.Andreas Osiander points out that unlike what Carr implies, Zimmern, like Angell, was very far from seeing pu blic opinion as necessarily a force for peace.25 Like Angell, he believes that the conflicts in the international arena, giving rise to war are resultant of intellectual, and not political failure.26 However, if Carr is to be believed, Zimmern can, in fact, be seen as being more extreme than Angell. Carr states in The Twenty Years Crisis that Zimmern is inclined towards the hypothesis that If mankind in its international relations has signally failed to achieve the rational good, it must have been too stupid to understand that good. Carrs statement is not altogether justified. Although Zimmern does point out that the impediment to overcoming the obstacle towards peace is that man are beings of orthodox temper and limited intelligence27, what he implies is that man is reluctant to adjust to present realities brought by modernity. As a result of the inherent resistance towards change, mans mental capacity does not adapt to the fact that previous ways of managing international relati ons are no longer applicable.Consequentially, public opinion cannot be trusted to be rational. Zimmern subscribes to John Stuart Mills argument of the tyranny of the majority. He argues that the ruling elite, that is, the politicians in positions of power tend to be capable of rationalization. However this intellectual minority in giving medication is consumed by the irrational public for statesmen, however wise and far sighted, are limited in their policies by the public opinion and parliaments to which they are responsible.28 Angell concurs on this issue. J. D. Miller, drawing from Angells comments, argues that Angell too feared the impact upon politicians of an unreasoning tug mind, and doubted the capacity of politicians to resist it.Both Angell and Zimmern, then, prefer that the intellectual minority be given the ability and power to lead the rest of the populace, so as to govern rational foreign policies. In this regard, Carr again differs. Whereas Carr does equip that the intellectual minority has a role to play in leading public opinion,29 he believes that the intellectual minority is however, sadly, out of touch with reality. He argues his case by drawing on the difference between intellectuals perceptions of the League of Nations with those of the man on the street. The intellectuals, who tend to be idealists by his definition, strive to secure and maintain peace via means of treaties, covenants and legal codifications. The general public, however, is more concerned with the practice of international affairs (as opposed to the theory.) spill by Carrs understanding of rational behaviour to be taking into account what is right and also what is most practical in application, the intellectual minority is in practice less rational than the public. budge and the possibility of progressAs it is, there seems to be a great divide between Carr and his cardinal contemporaries with regards to whether man is rational. However, central to their arguments is the shared belief that history is a directional process, that is, there is the idea of constant change. Carr argues that war occurs because of the conservative reluctance to allow change to the status quo and the way to peace is to provide means of peaceful change.30 Angell and Zimmern suggest that war occurs because man has yet to come to terms with change, and that the mentality and psyche of the populace has not kept in line with international developments. As Zimmern states, the statesmen and the peoples have not set their minds to the new realities31.The central concern with the issue of change harkens to a broader issue on which the three writers concur the possibility of progress. The interwar context is one of pessimism. The first decade had been one of recovery and rehabilitation from the shock of the Great War and the second decade of mounting tensions and escalation to an even more disastrous war. The context in which these writers write in, therefore, begets the questio n of whether man can move away from destruction of war, and by what means.The three writers agree that the current situation calls for change, as present movements and measures to maintain peace are insufficient and inadequate, and are reasonably upbeat that such change can be effected. Carr notes even in 1936 that, the cause of peace has made tremendous stride during the past fifteen years and shows his preference towards progressive history, arguing that a sense of change as a progressive factor in history, and belief in reason as our guide for the understanding of its complexities are crucial to the current world. Angell is of the same mind when he questions the unchangeability of human nature and argues that just as cannibalism and slavery can be systematically reduced in our society, so too can the warlike nature of man and states32. Zimmern, even when decrying the decline of international standards (which he defined as rules of behaviour) at a meeting at Chatham House in 1937 argues that the process of change allowing for peaceful coexistence was already taking place.33The ultimate aim of change is the maintenance of peace, which is assumed to be the preferred good, through the avoidance of war. The question that is then posited is, by what means? Carr, Angell and Zimmern propose different measures but the one pertinent to the prior argument on public opinion and rationality is their faith in education. Due to their fundamental belief that public opinion matters, it is logical to argue that if the public mind, as Angell would call it, could be trained and discover to favour peaceful change, then the chances of states going to war would be minimized. Angell quotes in his The Great Illusion that Not the facts, but mens opinions about the facts is what matters, and making a parallel with the abolishment of hagfish hunts, he comments that just as in the matter of burning witches a change of behaviour was the outcome of a change of opinion in a same way a change in the political conduct of can only come about as a result of a change of thought34. The way to peace then is to shape mans perceptions about war.Given this understanding, the most basic and possibly most efficient way of bringing about this conditioned public is through education. However in his address given to Chatham House in 1931, Angell claims that the current education system does not adequately prepare the someone to make intelligent and informed inferences from the facts presented to him. He believes that the reason behind this lack in the system is that education tends to follow a tradition whereby an older generation influences and determine the younger through a process of socialization.35 Unfortunately this tradition means that values and ideas that are taught are often unable to catch up with present realities. The educational system had also focused on provision of information, without equipping the individual with means to discern the motivations, the caus ation analysis, the implications et cetera behind the piece of information.According to him, We have thought too much of the facts and too little of their meaning. 36 Thus the socialization/education of an individual does not adequately provide him with the skill to make rational choices. Given his premise that war is irrational under any circumstances lest in defence and a rational public will therefore reject war, the skill deficiency means that man may choose to go to war due to their lack of understanding, unless the educational system can be changed.Beyond the suggestion that education shifts its focus from its informational purpose towards equipping successive generations with the skill to possess information, Angell does not however provide for how education can be otherwise structured. Zimmern elaborates on his ideal educational system in his book Learning and Leadership, which is not only designed to impart the skill of discerning information but also specifically equipped to teach students about international life.Particularly, he believes that practical experience through interaction with people from other nations will allow students to imbibe the habit of cooperation and harmonious living37. Zimmern believes that once people are given more vulnerability to the international arena, they will be able to understand foreigners and foreign influences better and become more astutely aware of the idea of universal brotherhood. This basic premise being established, man will be more able to understand the actions of others, less inclined to take preemptive action and to go to war. The assumption of such an argument is that people are less inclined to advocate war against a party that they share an understanding with. Education is thus seen as an instrument which can build commonality among peoples, as well as a means by which the public can be trained to be rational.In The Twenty Years Crisis, Carr argues for the application of reason to understanding cur rent situations and political reality in his later work What is History he extends the role of reason to the capacity to reformThe primary function of reason, as applied to man in society, is no longer merely to investigate, but to transform and this heightened consciousness of the power of men to improve the management of his social, economic and political affairs by the application of rational processes seems to me one of the major aspects of the twentieth century. 38The hollow assumptions here are that reason leads to progress and progress is necessarily an avail. Remembering the key concern of the study of international relations in the interwar period, a foremost improvement of the human condition is the eradication of war. As do Angell and Zimmern, Carr believes that education was to be the tool by which such improvement can come about. However, unlike Zimmern and Angell who believe that the public has to be thought how to make rational choices in the first place, Carr belie ves that education can be used to shape the way the public thinks about their choices. Carr notes then that education policy must be shapedEducators at all levels are like a shot more and more consciously concerned to make their contribution to the shaping of society in a particular mould, and to inculcate in the rising generation the attitudes, loyalties and opinions appropriate to that type of society educational policy is an integral part of any rationally planned social policy.39It is then assumed, that rationally, a society will be prefer not to resort to war in a conflict of interest, and a means by which this can be ensured is to design an educational system which, in the context of the interwar years, should imbue in them the moral norm that peaceful change is the preferred means of achieving policy objectives.To put it more plainly, Carrs ideal is using education to persuade man against the doctrine of power, providing a basis whereby a compromise between morality and powe r can be reached and peaceful change achieved. In his contention that thought is relative to purpose, Carr postulates that mass opinion can directed and in fact mass-produced via universal familiar education. It is imperative to note that by popular education, Carr has included the mass media.( Carr does not, however differentiate between education and propaganda in The Twenty Years Crisis though in What is History, he associates education with rationality and the developing consciousness from below as well as from above of the role which reason can play40).The application of reason and rationality therefore means that education can be used to persuade mankind against war. Instead of making an argument that war is irrational, educators can influence the public into making a conscious choice not to use war as a policy instrument. As Carr states, I regard as of immense importance and promise the gradual extension of the area of the worlds surface within which war has been effectivel y been placed under the ban, such that war is actually unthinkable41.What becomes elicit is how closely Carr mirrors the utopians he derides. Peter Wilson, in his attempt to understand what Carr means by utopian, lists the various characteristics that Carr associates with the term. According to his analysis, all of these characteristics are progressive ideas and it might be therefore be concluded that the core characteristic of interwar idealism is belief in conscious, progressive change. On this basis, Carr does not seem to be any much different, which recalls Reus-Smits observation quoted earlier in this paper that Carr is himself not a consummate realist. It is also possible to put forth an argument that Carrs argument against utopianism was never meant to be an outright and unconditional rejection of the interwar theories.ConclusionWhether or not these three writers think the public mind is rational depends largely on whether they believe war can be a rational choice, and ye t regardless of their perspectives on these two issues, they believe that progress towards avoidance of war can be ensured through changing human behaviour. Education policies thus become important, as they can shape the perceptions of the public and thus affect their choices, which is in turn reflected in the chosen foreign policy. However there is a point to note based on this argument set. All three writers are writing within a democratic framework and tradition, where by definition, requires that public opinion matters. Yet, public opinion is less likely to make an impact in an authoritarian state, and even in democratic states, there is the consideration of public apathy, the leaders gambling and taking risks by not going according to public opinion, et cetera.These complications bring us back to the consideration of Wilsonian politics. Woodrow Wilson professes that his aim is to make the world safe for democracy, and that democracy will bring peace. His tendency has been to l ook at the building and maintenance of peace from a top down approach, where the political structure and political ideologic apparatus are enforced. In other words, he looks to providing a mechanism which will allow the rational public to prevent the tendencies of the militant minority from dragging the state to war. However, from the ideas of Carr, Angell and Zimmern, such a mechanism would not function effectively against war unless the public mind can be first conditioned through a fitting educational system emphasizing co-operation and peace.1 David Long, Conclusion Interwar idealism, liberal internationalism and coeval international theory. Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis Inter-war idealism reassessed. p. 303, pp. 306-307.2 Quoted in E. H. Carrs inaugural speech in the University College of Wales. Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace worldwide Affairs (Royal demonstrate of foreign Affairs 1931-1939). Vol. 15. No. 6. (Nov- Dec 1936), p. 846.3 Mortimer Chambers, et al. The Western Experience Vol C The Modern Era. pp. 892-8934 A. J. P. Taylor, From Sarajevo to Potsdam. capital of the United Kingdom Thames & Hudson 1966 pp. 103-1065 Peter Wilson. Introduction The Twenty Years Crisis and the Category of Idealism in world-wide Relations. David Long & Peter Wilson. (ed.) Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis Inter-war idealism reassessed. Oxford Oxford University coerce 1995. p.16 Carrs term utopians is generally taken to refer to the idealists, though he does not clearly define who he considers to be utopians.7 Wilson, Introduction, p. 12. Wilson adapted the equation from Hedley Bull, The Twenty Crisis Thirty Years On, International Journal, fill in 24, Vol. 4 (1969), p. 627-8. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939. new(a) York Harper (1946) 1964. pp. 11-21.8 Brian C. Schmidt. Lessons from the Past reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations. International Studies Quarterly (1998) 42. p 4529 Andreas Osiander, Rer eading Early Twentieth Century IR theory Idealism Revisited, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Sep.,1998). p. 41710 Paul Rich, Alfred Zimmerns Catious Idealism the League of Nations, International Education, and the Commonwealth. Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis Inter-war idealism reassessed. p.88 Peter Wilson, Carr and his Early Crtics responses to the Twenty Years Crisis. Michael Cox (ed). E. H. Carr A critical appraisal. New York Palgrave 2000. p. 167.11 J. D. Miller. Norman Angell and Rationality in International Relations. Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis Inter-war idealism reassessed. pp. 116, 119.12 Alfred Zimmern, Learning and Leadership a study of the needs and possibilities of international intellectual co-operation. London Oxford University Press 1928. p. 10 p. 82.13 Carr, Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace pp. 857-858.14 Norman Angell, Peace and the Public Mind. June 12, 1935. http//www.nobel.se/cgi-bin/print. March 24, 2004.15 E. H. Carr, The Tw enty Years Crisis. pp. 132-133 pp. 67-7516 Norman Angell Peace and the Public Mind. para. 1917 quoted in E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis. p 24.18 Ibid. p. 26 p. 4119 The line of reasoning here is tied to the idea of an international game theory, which due to practical constraints cannot be covered here. The argument is made in line with Robert Jervis theory on international behaviour in his Cooperation Under Security Dilemma World Politics. Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jan, 1978), pp.167-214.20 Stephen van Evera, Why co-operation failed in 1914. World Politics, Vol. 38. No. 1 (Oct, 1985). p. 8121 Christian Reus-Smit, The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory. European Journal of International Law. Vol. 12. No. 3. pp. 578-9.22 J. D. Miller. Norman Angell and the Futility of War Peace and the public mind. London Macmillian 1986. pp/ 124-125.23 Norman Angell. Peace and the Public mind. para. 1724 Norman Angell. Europes Optical Illusion. London Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent , 1909(?) 24-40 The Great IllusionA study of the relation of military power to national advantage. London William Heinemann 1913. pp. 26-40.25 Andreas Osiander, Rereading Early Twentieth Century IR theory p. 41726 Alfred Zimmern, Learning and Leadership. p. 11.27 Alfred Zimmern, The Problem with Collective Security (ed) Q. Wright. Neutrality and Collective Security. Chicago University of Chicago Press 1936. p. 8.28 Ibid.29 E. H. Carr, Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace. p. 854.30 E. H. Carr. The Twenty Years Crisis. pp. 208-22331 Alfred Zimmern Learning and Leadership. p. 2232 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion. 1913. pp. 200-221.33 Alfred Zimmern, The disapprove of International StandardsInternational Affiars (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939). Vol 17. No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1938), p. 21.34 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion. P. 32735 Norman Angell, Popular Education and International Affairs International Affairs (Royal Institute of International affairs 1931-1939) Vol. 11, N o. 3 (May 1932), p. 32336 Ibid, p 335-338, 33837 Alfred Zimmern Learning and Leadership. p. 26-6038 E. H. Carr. What is History? New York , St. Martins Press , 1961 p 19039 Ibid.40 Ibid p. 195. Propaganda is associated with the emotive and not with reason.41 E. H. Carr. Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace. p. 861.